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OVERVIEW 
On August 2, 2011, President Obama signed the Budget Control Act of 2011 into law, which will reduce net 
federal spending by $2.1 trillion over ten years and raise the debt ceiling by up to $2.4 trillion.  With the nation’s 
debt nearly reaching the $14.3 trillion debt ceiling, the Act was a bipartisan compromise negotiated between 
the Administration and Congressional leaders, just before the nation was to breach the debt ceiling.  
Medicare could be a component of forthcoming efforts to reduce the national debt, although there is 
considerable uncertainty about the magnitude of potential savings and the scope of how they would be 
achieved.  Federal spending for the Medicare program has continually been part of the deficit and debt ceiling 
discussions because Medicare accounted for 15 percent of the federal budget in 2010, and is projected to grow 
as a share of the economy due to rising health costs and a Medicare population expected to nearly double in 
size between now and 2055.1 The Budget Control Act sets forth a process that could result in Medicare savings, 
if approved by the new Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction, known as the “Super Committee”, and 
enacted into law, or if that fails, through a sequester that would reduce spending, beginning in 2013.  Additional 
Medicare savings could be considered this year to avoid a 29.4 percent reduction in Medicare physician fees.   
These additional savings would come on top of the $424 billion in net Medicare ten-year savings enacted last 
year in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) of 2010.  
This issue brief provides an overview of the 
new law, describing the timeline and process 
for raising the debt ceiling and lowering the 
federal deficit (Exhibit 1).  It describes the 
role of the new Joint Select Committee on 
Deficit Reduction, examines how Medicare 
spending could be affected by changes 
proposed by the Committee, or if that 
process fails, by sequestration.  The brief 
also summarizes prior laws that were 
designed to reduce the federal deficit 
through limits on federal spending and 
sequestrations affecting both discretionary 
and mandatory spending, including 
Medicare.        
BACKGROUND 
Federal expenditures for the 48 million people covered by Medicare exceeded $520 billion in 2010, and are 
projected to reach $970 billion by 2021.2  As a result, each of the major debt reduction proposals released in 
2010 and 2011, including the Bowles-Simpson Plan, the Domenici-Rivlin Plan, and the House Budget Resolution, 
include Medicare savings as part of a broader package of proposed recommendations.  Proposals vary in terms 
of the magnitude of Medicare savings to be achieved and the nature of the proposed reforms.  Some would 
reduce Medicare spending by relatively substantial reforms such as transitioning to a premium support system,3 
while others would keep the structure of the program intact and achieve savings through other means.  
The Budget Control Act of 2011:  Key Dates
Date Action/Deadline
2011:
Sept. 16 Joint Select Committee meets
Sept. 21
Debt ceiling raised by additional $500 billion unless Joint Resolution 
of Disapproval is enacted
Oct. 1 – Dec. 31 Congress required to vote on Balanced Budget Amendment
Oct. 14
Deadline for House and Senate committees to send suggestions to 
Joint Select Committee
Nov. 23 Deadline for Joint Select Committee to vote on proposal
Dec. 23 Deadline for Congress to vote on Joint Select Committee bill
Late 2011/2012 
[Exact date to be 
determined]
Debt ceiling to increase by $1.2 - $1.5 trillion, unless Joint Resolution 
of Disapproval is enacted
FY 2013 – FY 2021
Sequester of $1.2 trillion, less the amount saved by the Joint Select
Committee 
Exhibit 1
SOURCE:  Kaiser Family Foundation analysis of Budget Control Act law.
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The debate over Medicare’s role in deficit reduction discussions follows significant reductions in Medicare 
spending enacted last year in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) of 2010.  The law included 
more than $424 billion in net Medicare savings ($528 billion in gross Medicare savings) over a ten-year period, 
reducing annual payment updates to hospitals 
and other providers by $196 billion and 
payments to Medicare Advantage plans by 
$136 billion over ten years.4  Additionally, the 
law created the Independent Payment 
Advisory Board (IPAB) and charged it with 
developing proposals to reduce Medicare 
spending if the projected per capita growth 
rate exceeds target levels.5  The Medicare 
savings included in the health reform law were 
projected to reduce aggregate spending by 6 
percent over the 10 year period.6   As a result 
of these changes and other factors, Medicare 
per capita spending is projected to grow on 
average by about 3.5 percent between 2010 
and 2019, substantially less than the 5.4 
percent per capita growth in private health 
insurance expenditures (Exhibit 2).  
Many of the reductions in spending made by the ACA have not yet been implemented, and their long-term 
impact on Medicare remains to be seen.  The Chief Actuary of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services 
recently expressed his concern that reductions in payment to providers included in the ACA could make it 
difficult for certain providers to remain profitable, and could result in providers no longer participating in 
Medicare, possibly jeopardizing access to care for beneficiaries.7  Additionally, the Office of the Actuary 
projected that, by 2019, Medicare rates are projected to be lower than those currently paid for Medicaid, and 
that the update reductions would not be sustainable over the long term.8   
Against this backdrop, The Budget Control Act of 2011 was enacted August 2, establishing a pathway to raise the 
debt ceiling and reduce the deficit, with potentially significant implications for Medicare.  
THE BUDGET CONTROL ACT: PROCESS AND TIMELINE  
The Budget Control Act of 2011 raises the debt ceiling by up to $2.4 trillion in order to allow the federal 
government to continue to fund its obligations.  The initial $900 billion increase coincides with a round of 
spending reductions (caps in discretionary spending and changes to student loan programs), and an additional 
increase in the debt ceiling will be tied to further spending reductions and possibly also revenue increases.  
These actions will occur in multiple steps. 
Increase in the Debt Ceiling   
The Act raised the debt ceiling by $400 billion on August 2 and will increase it by an additional $500 billion on 
September 21, unless a Joint Resolution of Disapproval is passed by the House and Senate and signed into law 
by President Obama by that date.   
The initial increase in the debt ceiling coincides with the imposition of caps on discretionary spending and 
changes to the student loan programs, saving $917 billion between fiscal year (FY) 2012 and FY2021.9  If 
discretionary spending exceeds the cap in a given year, the additional spending will be automatically reduced 
Projected Increase in Medicare Per Capita Spending 
Relative to Per Capita GDP and Private Insurance, 
2010 - 2019
5.4%
2.8%
3.5% 3.6%
1.9%
Private Health
Insurance
Medicare Medicare
 + SGR
GDP CPI
SOURCE:  Kaiser Family Foundation analysis.
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through across-the-board reductions, known as a “sequestration,” in discretionary spending.  The caps on 
discretionary spending do not apply to Medicare (or Medicaid or Social Security) because these are mandatory, 
rather than discretionary programs.10   
In the future, the debt ceiling will need to be raised again to allow the government to continue to fund its 
obligations.  At that point, the debt ceiling will be increased between $1.2 trillion and $1.5 trillion, if the 
President releases a certification of need, and a Joint Resolution of Disapproval is not enacted within 15 days 
thereafter.  This increase in the debt ceiling will coincide with additional deficit-reduction measures—either 
spending reductions, possibly in conjunction with revenue increases, based on recommendations by the Joint 
Select Committee’s proposals, or automatic reductions in spending through sequestration. 
New Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction 
Congressional leaders are required to establish a new Joint Select Committee, also known informally as the 
“Super Committee,” which will be tasked with decreasing projected deficits by $1.5 trillion between FY2012 and 
FY2021.  The Committee has broad authority to propose changes to meet its target, including changes to 
Medicare, Social Security, Medicaid, defense, taxes, and any other element of the budget.  Thus, the Committee 
may consider a number of Medicare savings proposals that have been discussed over the past year, including, 
for example, transforming the program from a defined benefit to a defined contribution plan, raising the age of 
Medicare eligibility, increasing beneficiaries’ premiums and cost sharing, reducing payments to providers, 
strengthening the role of the IPAB, and requiring pharmaceutical manufacturers to provide larger rebates on 
prescription drugs.11  
The 12-member Committee includes six members from the Senate, selected by the Senate Majority and 
Minority Leaders, and six members from the House, selected by the Speaker of the House and the House 
Minority Leader.  Congressional leaders have appointed Representative Jeb Hensarling and Senator Patty 
Murray as co-chairs. Others appointed to the Committee are Senators Max Baucus, John Kerry, Jon Kyl, Pat 
Toomey, and Rob Portman and Representatives Xavier Becerra, Dave Camp, James Clyburn, Fred Upton, and 
Chris Van Hollen.   
The Joint Select Committee is required to have its first meeting no later than September 16 and is required to 
draft and vote on a proposal for decreasing the debt a little more than two months later, by November 23.  The 
Senate and House Committees have until October 14, 2011 to send their recommendations for spending 
reductions or revenue increases to the Joint Select Committee for consideration.  If a majority of the Joint Select 
Committee votes to approve the proposal, Congress will consider the Committee’s proposal under expedited 
rules with a simple majority vote.12  Congress cannot amend or change the proposal, and must vote on it by 
December 23—just one month after the deadline for the Committee to vote on its proposal.  The proposal must 
be enacted into law by January 15, 2012 to avoid automatic, across-the-board reductions in government 
spending through sequestration.   
Sequestration 
If the Joint Select Committee’s proposal is not enacted by January 15, or if proposal is enacted but saves less 
than $1.2 trillion over ten years, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) would calculate 
the sequestered amounts that would be needed to ensure that savings total $1.2 trillion for FY2013 to FY2021.  
For example, if the Joint Select Committee’s proposal were to be enacted but included only $300 billion in 
savings and revenue increases, the sequestration process would reduce spending by an additional $900 billion to 
achieve total savings of $1.2 trillion.  The sequestered spending would be divided equally amongst the fiscal 
years 2013 through 2021, and half of the sequestered spending each year would be drawn from defense 
functions, with the other half drawn from non-defense functions, including such things as Medicare, cost-
sharing subsidies in the health reform exchanges beginning in 201413, and farm price supports, vocational 
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rehabilitation basic state grants, and the Social Services block grant.  In 2014 and thereafter, the discretionary 
savings would be achieved through reductions in the caps on discretionary spending.   
The law limits the amount of savings that would be achieved through Medicare savings, capping reductions at 2 
percent of payments to providers and plans per year of sequestration, and would apply to Medicare payments 
to Medicare Advantage plans, Part D (prescription drug) plans, and providers, including but not limited to 
hospitals and physicians.  In 2013, 2 percent of payments to plans and providers would be approximately $10 
billion.14 
The sequestration would not affect:  
 Premiums under Parts B and D  
 Cost-sharing for Medicare-covered services 
 Medicare premium and cost-sharing subsidies under Part D; and  
 Revenues to the Medicare Part A trust fund. 
While sequestration would not directly raise beneficiaries’ premiums and cost-sharing, it is possible that 
reductions in payments to plans and providers could indirectly affect beneficiaries’ out-of-pocket costs, if, for 
example, Medicare Advantage plans shift costs to beneficiaries by raising premiums or cost-sharing.  Reductions 
in payments to providers would come on top of savings enacted in the 2010 health reform law, potentially 
affecting access to and quality of care, and resulting in providers shifting costs to other health insurers or 
otherwise changing the mix of services they provide. 
Balanced Budget Amendment 
The Budget Control Act also requires Congress to vote on a Balanced Budget Amendment to the Constitution 
between October 1 and December 31, 2011.  The effect of a Balanced Budget Amendment on the Medicare 
program would depend upon the bill’s legislative language.   
PRIOR LAWS: SEQUESTRATION AND MEDICARE  
The Budget Control Act of 2011 is not the first law to include a sequestration mechanism to constrain federal 
spending, with implications for Medicare.  
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (Gramm-Rudman Hollings Act) established 
declining deficit targets, with the hope of achieving a balanced budget by FY1991.  If Congress did not meet one 
of the targets, the law required a sequestration for both mandatory and discretionary spending.  Medicare was 
not exempt, although reductions were capped annually at 2 percent of Medicare payments to providers.15  
Medicaid was exempt from sequestration, as were other low-income programs and Social Security.  In fact, a 
sequestration occurred in FY1986 and FY1990, but   Congress avoided sequestration from FY1987 and FY1989, 
and reduced the sequestration in FY1990, through various means.16  For example, in 1987, Congress revised the 
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act by raising the deficit targets and setting FY1993 as the new target date for 
achieving a balanced budget.17  Some have criticized the Act for requiring Congress to take responsibility for 
deficits outside of its control, such as those due to poor economic conditions, rather than applying spending 
restrictions only to new legislation under the control of Congress.18    
The Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 (BEA), enacted as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, 
effectively replaced the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act.  It included a pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) rule, which required 
all new mandatory spending and revenue legislation in a given fiscal year to be offset and not increase the 
deficit, or reduce the surplus, for that year, and the OMB tracked spending and revenues on a scorecard.  If 
Congress violated the PAYGO rule (i.e., the scorecard amount was greater than zero), sequestration of 
mandatory spending, including Medicare, would be triggered.19  The BEA raised the limits on sequestration of 
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Medicare spending from 2 percent to 4 percent of payments to providers, and continued to exempt Medicaid, 
other low-income programs, and Social Security from sequestration.  The BEA included a separate process that 
set caps on discretionary spending, which were enforced by sequestration.20   
From FY1991 to FY1999, mandatory and discretionary spending mostly complied with the PAYGO rule and 
discretionary spending limits.  However, beginning in FY2000, spending began to deviate substantially from 
these limits, and Congress used a variety of techniques to prevent large sequesters from occurring.  For instance, 
Congress enacted the Defense Appropriations Act in FY2002, which required OMB to zero-out the PAYGO 
scorecard for FY2001 to FY2002 in order to avoid a sequestration of $130 billion.21  Although Congress extended 
the BEA in 1993 and 1997, the law effectively expired in 2002 when Congress set the OMB scorecards for the 
remaining years of the law to zero.22    
The Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010, established in February 2010, uses the same general PAYGO 
mechanism as the BEA, with some important differences.  For example, the 2010 law allows Congress, until the 
end of 2011, to exclude the costs through December 31, 2014 of reforming the sustainable growth rate (SGR) 
formula to prevent automatic reductions in Medicare payments to physicians and does not require offsets for 
revenue loss associated with extending some tax cuts.23  The Act continues to exempt Medicaid, other low-
income programs, and Social Security from sequestration.  It also allows up to 4 percent of Medicare payments 
to providers to be sequestered.   
Congress complied with the PAYGO requirement in the first year of this Act, although about $1 trillion over ten 
years was excluded because it was designated as emergency spending or adjustments to current policy.24  This 
PAYGO mechanism is still in effect and is permanent unless overridden.25   
POLICY ISSUES FOR THE FUTURE 
The Budget Control Act imposes caps on discretionary spending, raises the debt ceiling, and requires further 
reductions in federal spending that will be implemented either by enacting the recommendations of the Joint 
Select Committee on Deficit Reduction or by imposing across-the-board, automatic spending reductions through 
sequestration.   
The Joint Committee’s ability to recommend drastic changes may be constrained by politics and the desire to 
submit a proposal that could be passed by Congress; however, the Committee’s scope of changes to programs is 
not legally constrained in any way.  This lack of constraints provides an opening for substantial changes to be 
made to the Medicare program, but it also allows for the Committee to take a more nuanced approach towards 
reductions in spending.    
If the Joint Committee’s proposal is not enacted, or does not achieve sufficient savings, then Medicare spending 
will likely be reduced by a sequestration.  Some may consider this to be a blunt approach to achieving savings, 
without regard to plans’ and providers’ operating margins.  The reductions in Medicare spending through a 
sequestration could further encourage improvements in productivity, to the extent there is currently excess cost 
or waste in the health care system; however, these savings come on top of recently enacted productivity 
adjustments in the health reform law, and amidst concerns of their long-term effects on access to care.  The 
reductions in Medicare payments to plans and providers could also coincide with spending cuts made by IPAB.   
Additionally, Congress may look for more Medicare savings to offset costs associated with preventing a 
reduction in Medicare payments to physicians, even though those costs are exempt from PAYGO through the 
end of 2014 and would not be required to be offset under current law.  Many deficit and debt reduction 
proposals, including Bowles-Simpson, Domenici-Rivlin, and the Senate “Gang of Six,” recommended reforming 
or replacing the SGR with a new payment system.26  According to the CBO, reforming the formula would cost 
$297.6 billion dollars for 2012 to 2021, assuming a freeze in payments without an update over the next 
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decade.27  This spending to reform the SGR formula would be in addition to any other Medicare savings needed 
to help reduce the deficit and debt. 
As in all budget decisions, there is a very delicate balancing act to be achieved between reducing federal 
spending to improve the overall financial health of the country, and not causing harm to the people served by 
federally funded programs.  
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